When properly grounded, constitutional law and rhetoric reveals how proof and persuasion operate in constitutional argument. The rhetorical perspective recognizes that our deepest constitutional disputes turn on value argument. Acknowledging value argument as a legitimate part of constitutional discourse in turn promotes rational discussion of the hard choices inherent in the Court's most vexing cases. A fully developed constitutional law and rhetoric framework thus helps us assess these vexing cases and confront what we really fight about when we fight about the Constitution.
What are the legitimate types of argument in constitutional debate? This is a perennial question in American law and every generation of constitutional scholars has the right to ask it anew. For over thirty years, Phillip Bobbitt's taxonomy of legitimate constitutional argument types has reigned as the most influential and enduring in the scholarly discourse. 1 In his recent article Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, Jamal Greene has proposed a rhetorical re-conception of Bobbitt's venerable typology.
2 Though Greene's rhetorical turn is welcome, his new typology is flawed. By identifying and correcting three critical errors in Greene's framework, this Article provides a rigorous theoretical grounding for the entire constitutional law and rhetoric project.
The first error identified is one of omission. 3 Greene introduces a new rhetorical dimension to Bobbitt's typology but fails to challenge Bobbitt's propositional account of constitutional argument -the view that legitimate debate is solely confined to propositions about what the constitution means. 4 Rhetoric comprehends the situation differently. pathos may directly support judgments about outcomes -who wins or loses particular cases. Such emotion-based judgments may derive from intuitive notions of right or wrong rather than from articulated propositions about constitutional meaning. 5 Though Greene defends the legitimacy of pathetic argument in constitutional law, he fails to defend the legitimacy of non-propositional argument. This Article fills that gap.
Constitutional debates may involve appeals to reason (logos), authority (ethos) and/or emotion (pathos
The second error corrected is taxonomic. 6 Greene usefully distinguishes between the subjects of constitutional argument (e.g., text, history, doctrine, etc.) and modes of persuasion in argument (i.e., logos, ethos, and pathos). However, Greene uses inconsistent terminology to describe this key distinction. This Article clears up potential confusion by introducing two time-tested rhetorical terms. Subjects of constitutional argument are identified as rhetorical topoi while modes of persuasion are described as rhetorical pisteis. On-the-ground constitutional argument is then conceptualized as the intersection of topoi and pisteis -the union of content and form. This vocabulary not only brings theoretical precision, it also helps explain Bobbitt's long misunderstood notion of "modality."
The third error identified has the most significance for general theories of constitutional adjudication. 7 Greene consciously omits Bobbitt's prior category of "ethical" argument from his new typology. This effectively removes "value argument" from the list of legitimate subjects of constitutional argument. This Article characterizes this move as descriptively and normatively flawed. Some of our society's most profound constitutional disputes implicate deep and conflicting values. Advocates can and should appeal to those values in framing their constitutional arguments. If we wish to honestly confront what we really fight about when we fight about the Constitution, value argument needs to be restored to our constitutional law and rhetorical typology.
Once these three basic errors are corrected, the constitutional law and rhetoric project will stand on stronger theoretical footing. Readers will understand the rhetorical nature of constitutional discourse and how proof and persuasion operate in constitutional argument. Such, at least, is this Article's ambition. Now comes the roadmap:
Part II sets the scene by describing Bobbitt's basic typology and Greene's proposed rhetorical modification. Part III identifies the challenge this modified typology poses to the standard propositional account of constitutional argument and defends its legitimacy. Part IV introduces the terms topoi and pisteis to clarify the distinction between constitutional subjects of argument and modes of persuasion.
Part V is the longest and most important Part. It makes the case that value argument belongs in the constitutional law and rhetoric typology and includes a novel analysis of the nature of rhetorical ethos. It also illustrates how the theoretical constructs described in the Article apply to explain three key cases from First and Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Part VI concludes.
II.
ARGUMENT TYPOLOGY AND RHETORIC Philip Bobbitt originally conceived his now-famous argument typology as part of an effort to account for the legitimacy of judicial review of constitutional questions by the Supreme Court.
8 Previous scholars had wrestled with the democratic problem inherent in judicial review 9 by advancing various arguments about the Constitution that all purported to legitimize review. 10 On Bobbitt's view, these scholarly debates could never "establish independent legitimacy for judicial review" because they were "conducted by means of arguments that themselves reflect identified constitutional argument as a self-contained and self-referential discourse that necessarily assumed the legitimacy of judicial review.
12
Since constitutional argument could never provide an external justification for its own legitimacy, Bobbitt proposed instead to look inward. He aimed to understand the "legal grammar that we all share and that we have all mastered prior to our being able to ask what the reasons are for a court having power to review legislation." 13 The core elements of this legal grammar, on Bobbitt's view, are the six archetypes of constitutional argument. 14 The specific six archetypes are historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential.
15
Participants in constitutional discourse "maintain" the legitimacy of judicial review through the continuous practice of archetypical arguing. 16 Although ancient in origin, this perspective on proof has radical contemporary implications when applied to constitutional discourse. Specifically, the rhetorical perspective suggests that proof in constitutional argument is not strictly governed by propositional logic. Even as he defends the legitimacy of pathos-based appeals, Greene fails to come to grips this implication. This Article therefore takes up the task.
III.
PATHOS AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL ARGUMENT When Bobbitt first set down his theory of constitutional argument types, he proposed to describe each type using a term of art: "modality." 37 Significantly, Bobbitt borrowed the concept of modality from analytic philosophy and then applied this analytic concept to law. 38 He defined constitutional modalities as "the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a constitutional point of view." 39 On Bobbitt's proofs such as "witnesses", "testimony of slaves taken under torture", and "contracts." Id.
In broad strokes then, non-artistic proofs concern evidence rather than argument. 34 See, e.g., Greene, Pathos at 1394 (labelling a pathetic appeal as "a mode of persuasion" and then distingsuishing subjects of argument from "forms of rhetoric."). 35 RHETORIC -KENNEDY TR 2D ED at 31, n. 11. Depending on context, pistis may take on many meaning including "appeal", "belief", "trust" and "faith." Id. See also GARVER, supra note 25, at 3 (framing entire book of essays as "a meditation on the connections among those terms [translating pistis]."). 36 More than this, the very concept of a "discourse" -a communication triangle joining speaker, audience, and subject matter in language -is itself bounded by logos, ethos, and pathos. See Starger, DNA of an Argument, supra note 26 at 1056, n. 46. Cf. Greene, Pathos at 1399 (rhetoric "is attuned not just to speaker (hence, ethos) and subject (hence, logos) but also to audience (hence, pathos). Since arguments in constitutional adjudication ultimately seek to persuade judges about outcomes in concrete cases, any analogy between legal argument and dispute in formal scientific or mathematical discourse is incomplete. Arguments in purely analytic disciplines can exclusively turn on abstract propositions because there is no judgment imperative. Proving or disproving propositions is the only point of the argument. Not so in law. Judgment comes first and judgment is not always analytic. Now it is of course correct that most constitutional argument is propositional. Giving reasons why proposition P (about the Constitution) is true or false is both extremely desirable and absolutely critical for the development of constitutional law over time. Propositional arguments drive academic constitutional law discourse and dominate the text of non- perfunctory Supreme Court opinions. This is as it should be -given the law's commitment to elaborating coherent rules. Thus, we can characterize the vast majority of constitutional arguments as having this form: Litigant L wins (the instant constitutional controversy) because proposition P (about the Constitution) is true à Proposition P is true because [constitutional argument].
So when do constitutional arguments take non-propositional forms? When do arguments directly support judgment without making a specific claim about constitutional meaning? In a word, the answer here is pathos. Pathos-based arguments sometimes make non-propositional appeals to judgment. Though Greene never challenges Bobbitt's propositional conception of modality, his conceptualization of pathos in constitutional adjudication effectively makes the point:
[I]n constitutional law, pathos is better described as a feature of constitutional conversation, a means rather than an end. The appeal to pathos occurs not because pathos offers information about the substantive constitutional content but because appealing to pathos helps win constitutional arguments. Pathetic legal argument, then, is a mode of persuasion as to the substance or valence of particular legal propositions. 42 In other words, pathos-based arguments do not always directly assert substantive propositions about the Constitution. Sometimes pathos-based appeals provide valence; they give emotional weight to particular propositions elsewhere advanced through logos-and/or ethos-based argument. This is an important insight. Without making the point explicitly, Greene's article demonstrates that Bobbitt's concept of modality needs to be modified to account for non-propositional pathetic appeals. Pathetic appeals bypass ordinary propositional argument by directly "manipulat[ing] the reader's emotions in order to persuade her [] as to the ultimate adjudicative outcome." 43 As Greene elegantly puts it: "Some outcome must be thus because deep down in your heart you know thus to be true." 44 To get a flavor of how non-propositional argument plays out in practice, consider a brief example. Greene points us to Justice Kennedy's dissent in Stenberg v. Carhart, a case concerning a Nebraska state law that prohibited so-called "partial birth" abortions. 45 A five-Justice majority struck down the Nebraska law. 46 In his dissent, Kennedy described the contested abortion procedure this way: "The fetus, in many cases, dies just as a human adult or child would: it bleeds to death as it is torn limb from limb." 47 According to Greene, Kennedy's "gruesome description" in this passage is "designed deliberately to disgust and shame the audience" and is "integral to the dissent's rhetorical mission."
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Now critics sympathetic to Bobbitt might object to calling the quote from Kennedy an argument -or at least to calling the quote a complete argument. Instead, Kennedy's words seem to constitute a move within an argument. According to this critique, it is wrong to call this move an argument because Kennedy's description does not state a proposition about what the Constitution means. It does not posit that outlawing partial-birth abortions is permissible under the Constitution because "the fetus… bleeds to death as it is torn from limb to limb."
The rhetorical response to this critique invokes the judgment imperative. All argument in Carhart ultimately supported judgment on Nebraska's law, whether it would stand or fall. Although Kennedy's "gruesome description" does not defend a specific proposition about the Constitution, it does express a coherent ground for ruling in favor of Nebraska. It expresses the argument that Nebraska should win because of the horror of the gruesome procedure.
Recognizing Kennedy's pathos in Carhart as an argument does not mean his was a good argument or a legitimate one. Let us focus on the 44 Id. at 1422. 45 See id. at 1394 (discussing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)). 46 Carhart, 530 U.S. 936-7 (finding law unconstitutional because it lacked any exception for preservation of health of mother). 47 Id. at 958-9 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 48 Greene, Pathos at 1394. legitimacy question for a moment. 49 If it stood alone, Kennedy's pathos would in fact be illegitimate. This is precisely because his argument defends no proposition about the Constitution. (Propositions are necessary for legitimacy). Kennedy's pathos, however, does not stand alone. His pathos instead works in conjunction with his doctrinal argument that the Nebraska law was consistent with rules set down in precedent. 50 While his doctrinal argument primarily proceeds via appeals to reason (logos) and authority (ethos), Kennedy's pathos provides an emotional impetus to accept his doctrinal interpretation above that of the majority.
Even if we disagree with Kennedy's doctrinal argument, we cannot deem it illegitimate -it did not fundamentally deviate from accepted norms of constitutional debate. Since Kennedy's pathos only served to give his otherwise legitimate doctrinal argument emotional valence, it would be pointless to judge his pathos illegitimate. Pathetic arguments may not assert propositions about constitutional meaning, but pathos plays an integral role in persuasion and is unavoidable when judgment is at stake. This is a necessary implication of Greene's article and a point worth making explicit.
IV. PISTEIS, TOPOI AND MODALITY
Bobbitt's original typology names six different constitutional "modalities": historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, prudential and ethical. Greene now challenges this typology as failing to distinguish between the "subjects" of constitutional argument and its "forms of rhetoric." 51 Greene identifies the forms of rhetoric as logos, ethos, and pathos and claims that all of Bobbitt's archetypes (except ethical argument) are better understood as subjects of constitutional argument.
52
While the distinction between constitutional subjects and modes of 49 On the other hand, assessing the merits of the conflicting positions in the abortion debate is well beyond the scope of this Article. Table   53 The labels for each axis implied by the table heading are less than ideal. "Modes of persuasion" refers to logos, ethos, and pathos while "Modalities of Argument" presumably refers to text, history, doctrine, structure, and consequences.
The issue with the "modes of persuasion" label is relatively minor. In his article, Green refers to logos, ethos, and pathos as "forms of rhetoric" or "modes of persuasion."
54 While these two descriptions are quite correct, it is important to recall that pisteis -the word Aristotle used to describe the rhetorical genus uniting the species of logos, ethos, and pathos -can also be translated as "proof." 55 Using the same word to describe proof and persuasion hammers home the rhetorical perspective on discourse: proof is what persuades. In order to keep this perspective 53 See id. at 1443 (Table) . 54 See, e.g., Greene, Pathos at 1394 (labelling a pathetic appeal as "a mode of persuasion" and then distingsuishing subjects of argument from "forms of rhetoric."). 55 See supra at 7-8.
present, it seems prudent to generically refer to logos, ethos, and pathos as pisteis.
56
The problem with Greene's "modalities of argument" label is more serious. Elsewhere in his article, Greene variously refers to the legitimate "subjects" of constitutional argument as "types", "archetypes" and "modalities." While Greene's type/archetype nomenclature makes sense, 57 his use of "modality" elides the very distinction he seeks to establish. This is because "modality" is Bobbitt's term of art and Greene's basic claim is that Bobbitt's framework improperly fails to distinguish between rhetorical mode and constitutional subject. Given this, it seems unwise to utilize Bobbitt's loaded term of art at all.
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Sticking to Aristotle's rhetorical nomenclature avoids such confusion. The appropriate rhetorical term for the axis referring to the subjects of constitutional argument is topos (plural: topoi). Topos means "place" and topoi are often referred to as "rhetorical topics." 59 For 56 Greene does refer to pisteis once in his article. See Greene, Pathos at 1398. My modest suggestion is to use the term generically. 57 As a synonym for "category", "type" carries no distracting substantive or analytical connotations. "Archetype" is a similarly generic term for a quintessential category. 58 To make matters worse, Greene at one point suggests that Bobbitt's understanding of modality actually better aligns with the modes of persuasion defined by logos, ethos, and pathos. Id. at 1445, n. 312. This would suggest that the labels on Greene's grid should be reversed. Greene's equivocation between "modality" as "subject" versus Aristotle, topoi were the metaphorical places in a discourse where speakers could look to find stock themes to build their arguments.
Aristotle distinguished between "common topics" and "special topics." 61 Common topics referred to lines of argument potentially relevant across all discourses. 62 This included arguments about "the possible and impossible", "past and future fact" and "degree of magnitude or importance" as well as arguments from grammatical form, analogy, definition, division, induction, purpose, consequence, and so on. 63 Special topics, on the other hand, were discourse-specific. For example, special topics in politics considered subjects like finances, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, and the framing of laws. 64 Aristotle also analyzed special topics in judicial rhetoric, systematically considering subjects relevant to debates over "justice and injustice" and "wrongdoers and those wronged."
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Returning to Bobbitt and Greene, it seems proper to describe as special constitutional law topoi those argument categories described by text, history, structure, doctrine, and consequences. 66 These topoi point to the subjects for argument accepted as legitimate in constitutional controversies. If an advocate or judge wishes to make an argument for or against the constitutionality of a contested law, for example, she will consider lines of analysis elaborating upon topoi of text, doctrine, or so on. At the same time, she will not waste time inventing arguments wholly disconnected from these legitimate topics.
67
Constitutional law topoi neither state transcendent truths about the Constitution nor indicate answers to disputed questions. Rather, they provide subject-matter tools to aid invention.
The two-dimensional approach thus disaggregates Bobbitt's framework along the axes of content and form. While topoi inspire the content of argument, pisteis provide rhetorical form. This disaggregation actually helps clarify the meaning of Bobbitt's troublesome notion of "modality."
As noted above, Bobbitt defined constitutional modalities as "the ways in which legal propositions are characterized as true from a constitutional point of view."
68 Ways of characterizing constitutional truth necessarily involve both content and form. Modality is thus best understood as describing the discursive intersection of topoi and pisteisthe union of content and form in actual constitutional argument. This modified understanding of modality can be visualized using a new grid. 67 Though he does not use the term, Bobbitt vivedly describes the futility of advancing arguments not drawn from accepted topoi. See BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE at 6 ("One does not see counsel argue, nor a judge purport to base his decision on arguments of kinship… Nor does one hear overt religious arguments or appeals to let the matter be decided by chance or reading entrails."). 68 See supra note 39. As argued above, I find Bobbitt's insistence that modality is propositional to be incomplete given the judgment imperative. See supra Part III.
Figure 2 -Constitutional Modalities: Union of Pisteis and Topoi
Careful readers will note that the figure above changes more than just the labels on Greene's table. The list of topoi contains one subject of constitutional dispute that Greene does not recognize -value argument. This Article maintains that Greene's failure to include value argument as a legitimate topos is a critical error and the one that most threatens the vitality of the constitutional law and rhetoric project. The next Part defends that charge.
V. VALUE ARGUMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
After transforming Bobbitt's one-dimensional list of argument modalities into a two-dimensional grid, Greene proposes another major structural change to Bobbitt's typology. Specifically, Greene advocates removing Bobbitt's category of "ethical argument" from the list of legitimate constitutional subjects of argument (which we now call topoi).
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Greene's move has obvious roots in Bobbitt's peculiar nomenclature: Bobbitt defines "ethical" arguments as "deriving rules from those moral commitments of the American ethos that are reflected in the Constitution." 70 Greene's reclassification of Bobbitt's ethical category thus infelicitously removes value arguments from the list of legitimate constitutional law topoi. This is a mistake because value arguments play a vital role in constitutional adjudication. The obvious solution is to reinstate value arguments as a legitimate constitutional topos and to acknowledge the logos-, ethos-, and pathos-based dimensions of this subject.
A. Ethical Argument v. Proof by Ethos
Since Bobbitt's ethical modality has attracted criticism, Greene's purging of the category from his argument typology is understandable. Indeed, some have denounced the ethical modality as "misleading" and "seriously flawed."
74 These critics have a point; Bobbitt's analysis of ethical argument can be obscure. Despite this academic bathwater, there is a baby worth saving. For Bobbitt is surely correct that the moral commitments of our constitutional system remain a legitimate subject for constitutional argument.
Greene's apparent rejection of this sensible position may be rooted in terminological confusion. The culprit word is "ethical." Greene argues that "remaining faithful to the Aristotelian conception of ethos" requires him to interpret Bobbitt's ethical category of argument as "parallel to rather than modified by logos and pathos." 75 in the same category as logos and pathos. Though this sounds reasonable enough, the reality is that Bobbitt never used ethos in its rhetorical sense.
The word ethos actually has multiple meanings. In Constitutional Fate, Bobbitt explains the meaning he intended:
In the end I decided on the term 'ethical' largely because of its etymological basis. Our word 'ethical' comes from the Greek ἠθικός (ethikos), which meant "expressive of character" when used by the tragedians. It derives from the ἦθος (ethos) which once meant the habits and character of the individual, and is suggestive of the constitutional derivation of ethical arguments. 84 Certainly, it makes sense to conceive of authority as a distinct mode of proof in law. Sometimes a judge will determine that the law means X based on a reasoned interpretation of sources A, B, and C. This is proof by logos. Occasionally, as Greene points out, the law will mean X because the judge feels X is true "deep down in [her] heart." This is persuasion through pathos. And very often, a judge will find the law means X simply because authority says the law means X. This is proof by ethos.
Proof by authority is entirely different than proof by reason or through emotion. Greene practically acknowledges as much, noting at one point that "the ipse dixit character of [] argumentation suggests an ethical cast." 85 Ipse dixit ("he, himself said it") is the paragon of argument based on naked authority rather than reason. Of course, every ethos-based argument need not make such a raw appeal to power. The point is just that ethos persuades through the authority of "character," not through character itself. Equally important, ethos need not derive from moral authority to 80 Id. at 38-39 and n. persuade. Depending on the discourse, successful authority can also be legal, religious, parental, academic and so on.
B. Morals and Values
Although Bobbitt's category of ethical argument shares its etymology with rhetorical ethos, the underlying concept is very different. Bobbitt uses the category to elucidate a particular kind of moral discourse in constitutional debate. By removing Bobbitt's ethical argument from his list of legitimate topoi, Greene effectively argues that reasoned (logical) discussion of values has no legitimate place in constitutional law. To demonstrate this, Figure 3 below The most striking feature of Figure 3 is the level of agreement between these three prominent constitutional law theorists. The consensus is ironclad on four topoi: history (relying on the intentions of framers and ratifiers of the Constitution); 89 93 Greene explicitly aligns his notion of argument from "consequences" with Bobbitt's "prudential" category. See Greene, Pathos at 1441 ("Prudential or consequentialist argument… speaks to a certain judicial pragmatism that recognizes that securing the rule of law over time requires the exercise of practical wisdom. Judges must attend to the political and economic circumstances surrounding a decision." (internal quotes and citations omitted)). Although Fallon does not assign such policy arguments a separate heading (thus the square brackets and italics in Figure 1) science. 110 Fallon suggests that value arguments play a special role in these situations. 111 When coherent arguments can be marshaled on either side of a constitutional question, values often do and legitimately should come into play.
This does not mean that all value arguments count as legitimate. Fallon argues that the certain "repositor[ies] of values" can be accepted as legitimate sources for value arguments (e.g., traditional morality, consensus values, natural law, economic efficiency) while other sources are rightly rejected (e.g., a judge's purely personal morality or religion or policy preferences).
112 Importantly, Bobbitt and Greene also share this concern with articulating an acceptable versus non-acceptable role for value argument. Bobbitt's unpopular solution is to tether acceptable value argument to an "American ethos." Greene rejects Bobbitt's solution but then does not deal at all with Fallon's more direct approach.
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Greene's own solution is to tie all value argument to pathos. Of course, it is correct that emotional appeal has a legitimate place in constitutional discourse about values. It is also true that "emotion [] precedes and motivates assessments of value" 114 and that "emotion reveals reasons, motivates action in service of reason, [and] enables reason." 115 Therefore, it would be a mistake to universally condemn or banish pathos from arguments conducted about history, text, doctrine, structure or consequences. The emotional valence of arguments about these topoi can usefully invoke value into deliberation.
Yet it does not follow that therefore all value arguments should be tethered to pathos. For it is more than possible to debate values in a strictly rational -that is to say logos-based -mode. Indeed, rational deliberation about values is critical for deciding close cases that require a frank assessment of our collective priorities. Fallon's work proves as much. Emotion is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Greene appreciates deliberation about values, but his schema leaves no room for independent logos-or ethos-based proof about the subject.
The simple solution to this shortcoming is to insert Fallon's topos of value argument back into Greene's rhetorical schema. Figure 2 reproduced again below visualizes the reformed schema. Note how this new configuration still leaves room for all the kinds of pathetic appeals that Greene compelling defends. It just also opens up more space for understanding legitimate value argument in constitutional law. Recognizing value argument as a legitimate topos invites rhetorical analysis of Perelman's vital concept of "value hierarchies." constitutional subject or mix appeals to logos, ethos, and pathos. Yet this fluid and multi-faceted reality does not undermine the grid's schematic utility. The map is not the territory; it is rather a tool to help identify and navigate the complex dynamics of persuasion in constitutional discourse.
C. Three Examples of Value Argument
Having set out the rhetorical theory, the time has come to examine value argument in practice. We will consider three brief examples: one taken from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence two from the First Amendment realm. Each example considers the phenomenon from a different angle. Taken together, the examples illustrate the centrality of value argument to our deepest constitutional conflicts.
Consider first Maryland v. King.
117 King was a 5-4 decision in which the majority upheld Maryland's law authorizing the collection and analysis of DNA taken from people arrested for, but not convicted of, certain serious crimes. 118 Debate in the case formally turned on topoi of doctrine and consequences. 119 Yet the conflict also implicated values at a very deep level. In his dissent's conclusion, Justice Scalia wrote:
Today's judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of solving more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples from anyone who flies on an airplane (…), applies for a driver's license, or attends a public school. Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.
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This short passage is pure value argument. And it relies upon logos, ethos, and pathos to condemn the majority's decision. The pathos in Scalia's argument here comes in his reference to a "genetic panopticon." He seeks to evoke a visceral reaction against the Maryland law by equating it with Big Brother surveillance. He does not, however, rationally justify calling an arrestee-only law a "panopticon." Scalia's reference to "the proud men who wrote our charter of liberties" and their likely reaction to the prospect of "open[ing] their mouth for royal inspection" sounds in both pathos and ethos. The humor is pathos. The reference to the founding generation and the implicit plea to their authority on this question exemplifies ethos.
At the same time, the whole paragraph is framed by logos. And it is a logos rooted in value hierarchy. Scalia admits that solving crimes using DNA testing has value. However, he posits that this crime-solving value does not always trump Fourth Amendment liberty (he places liberty higher in the value hierarchy). To persuade his reader on this point, Scalia reasons that a contrary value hierarchy would justify taking the DNA of anyone who flies on an airplane, applies for a driver's license, or attends public school. Whether readers approve or disprove of Scalia's logic here, there is no doubt that it is a logos-based argument about values.
Few would dispute that Scalia's analysis in King falls well within the realm of legitimate constitutional discourse. Yet Greene's schema does not properly capture and categorize the justice's arguments. Under the unmodified schema, the logic of Scalia's hierarchy probably would be equated with consequences (or perhaps history) and his discussion of value choices would be regarded exclusively as emotional appeal. This obscures the rationality inherent in Scalia's ordering of liberty above security. Our modified schema permits understanding his value appeal as rooted in logos while still recognizing that his argument uses pathos to achieve emotional valence and ethos to enhance argument authority. The case is made difficult not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom…will disintegrate the social organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds.
130
In this passage, Jackson mixes pathos and logos. He acknowledges the case's emotional stakes but appeals to freedom as a matter of both faith and reason.
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The challenge of isolating Jackson's rhetorical mode recurs throughout the opinion. Consider another line, which is among the most celebrated aphorisms in all of constitutional law:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion… 132 Is this an appeal based on logos, ethos, or pathos? Arguably, it is all three.
133 Though his precise rhetorical mode is hard to pin down, 134 the subject of Jackson's constitutional argument concerns value through and through.
135 130 Id. at 641. 131 The idea that we should have faith in freedom rather than fear freedom is an essentially emotional appeal to what we know "deep down in our hearts." At the same time, the idea that mandatory patriotism implies weak societal institutions is a logical argument. 132 Id. at 642. 133 The pathos in Jackson's statement is in his clear appeal to our deepest emotional intuitions about "our constitutional constellation." His logos is rooted in his analysis of the implications of the opposite proposition -that officials can dictate what shall be orthodox. See supra note 131. Finally, the absence of any external authority for his bold statement shows that Jackson relies on his own ethos to advance his argument, which is certainly enhanced by the eloquence of his writing. 134 The difficulty of isolating the precise appeal employed by Jackson thus stands as a vivid demonstration of the multi-faceted nature of many (constitutional) arguments. Cf supra at 26-27 (emphasizing the schematic nature of the grid). 135 Contra Frankfurter, Jackson places freedom of individual conscience above "promotion of national cohesion" in the "hierarchy of legal values." Notably, the particular kind of value argument advanced by Jackson here aligns perfectly with Bobbitt's idea of an appeal to the "American ethos." Here Jackson makes an argument about the "national character" of the United States. See supra at 22 (describing the practical equivalency of Bobbitt's ethical modality with value modality).
Once more, few would dispute the legitimacy of such canonical statements of constitutional principle. Yet the fluidity of Jackson's rhetorical mode makes clear that this legitimacy derives from the centrality of value choices to the Pledge debate rather than from recourse to logical, ethical, and/or pathetic appeals. In other words, it is the practical necessity and moral imperative of appealing to emotion when weighing the deep and conflicting First Amendment values of "national unity" versus "freedom of conscience" that renders Jackson's rhetoric legitimate. Alito's pathos is palpable here. His prose invites the reader to imagine every parent's worst fear, losing a child, turned into an utter nightmare haunted by malevolent fiends. He literally appeals to emotional vulnerability and condemns the majority for interpreting the First Amendment as condoning such brutality.
One viable interpretation of Alito's pathos is that it lends emotional valence to his subsequent First Amendment analysis. On this reading, we can classify his argument under the doctrine-pathos modality. At the same time, Alito's argument sounds in value-logos. Throughout his dissent, Alito intimates that basic decency requires the First Amendment not protect emotional attacks at funerals. He writes: "At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable… Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate."
142 This is a perfectly rational argument about values.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Snyder majority opinion. 143 For the most part, he makes by-the-book doctrinal arguments. However, in a move likely designed to counter Alito's passion, Roberts closes his opinion with a deliberately rational value argument:
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and-as it did here-inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course-to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.
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Here Roberts acknowledges the emotional stakes and effectively admits that the adjudicative outcome rankles. However, he urges us to accept his conclusion based on a rational value hierarchy -chosen by the Nationthat promotes public debate over public hurtful speech.
Taken together, a rhetorical reading of these opinions helps demonstrate the propositional/non-propositional dynamic described in Part III. The conflict between Alito and Roberts effectively pits a pathos-based strategy versus an ethos-and logos-based one. Of course, both jurists employ all three modes of persuasion in their opinions. Yet Alito clearly leans most heavily on emotion while Roberts makes his strongest appeals to authority and reason. Not coincidentally, Alito's most persuasive argument concerns the injustice of the ultimate outcome: it seems intuitively right that Snyder should win and Westboro should lose. On the other hand, Roberts is more persuasive on when defending a general proposition about constitutional meaning: the most rational reading of First Amendment authority seems to be that it protects even hurtful speech on public issues.
It is perhaps reassuring that logos and ethos appeared to trump pathos in Snyder. 145 To maintain legitimacy, propositional logic should normally prevail above outcome-driven intuition. However, Alito's pathos nonetheless fundamentally elevated the debate. It gave presence to the deeper value conflict at issue. His pathos forced Roberts to justify his conclusion with arguments beyond the doctrinal topos. And when Roberts weighed in on the value topos, he articulated the constitutional priority of protecting public debate over preventing emotional harm. The debate transcended the usual First Amendment morass of rules and tests and got 144 Id. at 1220. 145 Here it is worth rembering that Roberts spoke for eight members of the Court while Alito dissented alone. This was apparently not a difficult call for the Court as a matter of reason and authority.
to the real point of division. Our constitutional discourse ends up the richer because of this rhetorical exchange.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional law and rhetoric project leverages ancient insights to offer a critical perspective on the dynamics of proof in constitutional discourse. Adding a rhetorical dimension to Phillip Bobbitt's enduring typology of constitutional argument types makes great sense. However, a more rigorous theoretical grounding for constitutional law and rhetoric required correcting certain critical flaws in Jamal Greene's new framework.
The first correction pointed to the fundamentally adjudicatory nature of constitutional discourse. Unlike in formal disciplines such as mathematics, disputes in law cannot turn on abstract logical propositions alone. Because of the judgment imperative, non-propositional intuitions about right and wrong sometimes win arguments. This explains the power and inevitability of pathos in constitutional argument. It is a point entirely consistent with Greene's argument yet one he failed to make.
The second correction introduced the terms topoi and pisteis to clarify the key distinction between the subjects of constitutional argument (topoi) and the general modes of persuasion (pisteis). This taxonomic intervention both re-frames Bobbitt's concept of modality and makes the new two-dimensional argument classification scheme more coherent. Coherent classification of argument in turn facilitates understanding of constitutional debates. When Supreme Court Justices disagree over the command of the Constitution, case-specific details often obscure the debate. By abstracting their arguments into a general framework, rigorous rhetorical analysis can reveal the constitutional forest from the trees and identify the true axis of disagreement in a dispute.
As it happens, the true axis of dispute in the Court's most controversial cases often concerns competing values. Therefore, this Article advocated keeping "value" on the list of legitimate subjects of constitutional argument. Not only does this bring Greene's framework into line with those of Bobbitt and Fallon, it also comports with observed practice as demonstrated by examples drawn from Fourth and First Amendment jurisprudence.
Though this Article has argued that value argument deserves a place among the legitimate constitutional topoi, it bears emphasis that not all value arguments boast an equal claim to legitimacy. Indeed, constitutional actors often hotly contest the legitimacy of value arguments and hurl accusations of "judicial activism" at each other. Yet this discursive reality is precisely what makes value argument so important to study and understand.
Argument over the legitimacy of considering particular values and emotions in constitutional debate stand at ground zero of a larger struggle over the role of constitutional law in our society. Will constitutional law facilitate liberation and social change or will it uphold stability and social order? Different constitutional actors have proposed different answers to such questions over the course of our checkered constitutional experience. Recognizing value argument as a legitimate topos promotes rational, logos-based discussion of the hard choices inherent in the Court's most vexing cases. 
